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Abstract 
Despite the dismissive attitude toward the concept of judicial activism among 
some members of the academic community, it nevertheless continues to be a relevant 
theme in politics.  Conservatives tend to use this phrase as an attack on “liberal” 
decisions that sacrifice principles in the name of expediency. This thesis challenges the 
concept that it is primarily liberal justices who are activist.  I examine the activism levels 
of individual justices to ascertain which ideology, liberal or conservative, is more activist. 
Using the well-known Spaeth database, I evaluated all of the justices from the Warren 
through Rehnquist Courts by measuring three types of activism: federal-statute, state-
statute, and altering precedent. The results show members of both ideologies engaging in 
activism. 
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Many landmark cases that have transformed American society are the result of 
judicial activism.  One example is Brown v. Board of Education (1954).  Brown 
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which had maintained that segregation was 
acceptable so long as the schools for colored children were the same as schools for white 
children.  Brown overturned precedent, which is one form of judicial activism.  Another 
example is Roe v. Wade (1973).  Issues ranging from gambling to murder are traditionally 
the responsibility of the state.  However, the Supreme Court inserted itself into a 
previously defined state issue, when it legalized abortion and created a policy 
establishing time frames for abortions and when they may be performed legally (during 
which trimesters, for example).  Legislating from the bench or performing an action that 
is the responsibility of the state is also an act of judicial activism.  Arguably the first 
instance of judicial activism was in Marbury v. Madison (1803), which is also the case 
that established judicial review.  In this case, Chief Justice John Marshall declared the 
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that pertained to the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court unconstitutional because it granted jurisdiction that the Constitution did not.  
Striking down an act of Congress is also one version of judicial activism.  The examples 
provided give three entirely different definitions of what judicial activism is.  It is also 
important to keep in mind that the Supreme Court has discretionary appellate jurisdiction, 
which allows justices to pick the cases it would like to hear. Considering the amount of 
discretion the Court has, this action or inaction is arguably a more subtle form of judicial 
activism. 
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Judicial activism is typically invoked in rhetoric that is critical of liberal 
decisions.  However, there is no a priori reason to expect activism to differ by ideology.  
This is in stark contrast with the logical assumption that conservatives expect no change.  
Liberals are associated with change, so one could then conclude that they would be 
activists.  Ironically though, conservative justices fostered the first movement of activism.  
A well-known activist decision led by conservatives is Lochner v. New York (1905).  The 
Court struck down a New York statute that limited the hours bakers could work.  The 
Court exhibited symptoms of capitalism.  Conservatives claim to adhere to rigorous 
principles and a strict interpretation of the Constitution, yet here this New York statute 
was pushed aside with little thought to its constitutionality.     
Following the opinion of conservatives, my hypothesis would state that liberal 
justices of the Supreme Court are more likely to make activist decisions than are 
conservative justices.  However, the null hypothesis, which states that there is no 
difference in the activist decisions of liberal and conservative justices of the Supreme 
Court, seems more plausible assuming people act in their own self-interest. I will be 
using all of the cases decided by each justice on the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist 
Courts to create an activist average.  I will then be able to analyze quantitatively which 
justices are the most activist.  I will begin by defining judicial activism and summarizing 
the Courts that will be discussed and then I will explain my methodology and my results.  
A discussion on the literature provides the history of judicial activism as well as its 
various definitions.  Three definitions recur often and will be used as my measurement 
for each justice.  A discussion on judicial ideology will also be provided.  
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Literature Review 
Most living Americans first encountered both judicial activism and judicial 
restraint when President Nixon promised in his presidential campaign to only appoint 
strict constructionists to the Supreme Court. The term judicial activism actually first 
appeared in a 1947 article in Fortune magazine by Arthur Schlesinger Jr.  It focuses on 
the aftermath of Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt’s court packing, and thus 
largely liberal court, in a Republican era.  Schlesinger begins by calling Justices Hugo 
Black, William Douglas, Frank Murphy and Wiley Rutledge judicial activists.  He then 
states that Justices Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and Harold Burton pursue methods 
of self-restraint.  Stanley Reed and Chief Justice Fred Vinson were between the two 
groups (Schlesinger 74-8).  Schlesinger then compares the two groups and provides a 
working definition of judicial activism:  
One group (the Black-Douglas group) is more concerned with the employment of 
the judicial power for their own conception of the social good; the other (the 
Frankfurter-Jackson group) with expanding the range of allowable judgment for 
legislatures, even if it means upholding conclusions they privately condemn.  One 
group regards the Court as an instrument to achieve desired social results; the 
second as an instrument to permit the other branches of government to achieve the 
results the people want for better or worse (Schlesinger, 201). 
 
One reason for this great divide in judicial thought is that the Yale School of Law heavily 
influenced the views of Justices Black and Douglas.  This group recognizes that prior 
courts had been activist in their approaches toward business and financial interests, so 
why should this group resist?  The main difference being that liberal justices focus not on 
the business community but on civil liberties.  The mentality of a justice from the Yale 
school of thought is best described by the following: “The resources of legal artifice, the 
ambiguity of precedents, the range of applicable doctrine, are all so extensive that in most 
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cases in which there is a reasonable difference of opinion a judge can come out on either 
side without straining the fabric of legal logic… A wise judge knows that political choice 
is inevitable; he makes no false pretense of objectivity and consciously exercises the 
judicial power with an eye to social results (Schlesinger, 201).”  Schlesinger’s provision 
of the actions of a wise judge suggests that all justices, who are influenced by the Yale 
school of thought, are activist in some manner.  Schlesinger has provided a framework of 
judicial activism and many scholars have since expanded upon his definition.  This little 
known article has certainly stood the tests of time and is still a relevant modern definition 
of activism. 
 Following the historical usage of judicial activism, Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, 
Jr. was the first to use it in a judicial opinion.  The word was used in a footnote in the 
Theriot v. Mercer (1959) case.  The case was an incredibly interesting wrongful death 
suit that had no legitimate evidence against Theriot (Mrs. Mercer brought suit stating that 
Mr. Theriot killed her husband with his vehicle).  The supporting evidence that the court 
relied on was that Mr. Theriot, along with other motorists, passed by the body of the 
deceased on the road.  Theiort’s request for a directed verdict was twice denied and he 
was later found guilty by jury (Kmiec 1456).  On appeal, Judge Hutcheson wrote for the 
majority in the footnote of his opinion  
We think, however, we should say that in the controversy thus launched and still 
continuing, we stand firm against the judicial activism back of the struggle and 
the results it seeks to achieve, and, regarding as we do the guaranties of the 
Seventh Amendment, as applicable to plaintiff and defendant alike, we cannot 
understand how protagonists for the change can look upon the amendment, as 
apparently they do, as intended for the benefit of plaintiffs alone and, so regarding 
it, as the dissenters in the Galloway case apparently did, advocate doing away 
with or limiting, beyond the ancient use, the control and guidance of the trial by 
an informed and experienced judge (Kmiec, 1457). 
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In order to understand this reference to Galloway v. United States (1943) more 
information is needed.  Here, “Justice Black penned a famous dissent, lamenting the 
declining role of juries and arguing that trial judges should only be able to order new 
trials (Kmiec, 1456-7).”  Galloway was given a directed verdict instead of a trial by jury.  
The majority decided in a manner sympathetic to Hutcheson’s preference; the directed 
verdict was found to be acceptable. 
One can also analyze activism based on stages or specific eras. The following 
example shows that there have been periods of activism dominated by justices of both 
parties; the first by conservatives and the second by liberals: 
The first, which continued out of the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
involved the conservative Court’s development of constitutional doctrine to 
protect business and property.  In essence, during this period the Court actively 
and frequently undertook to frustrate state legislative, and then congressional 
efforts, to regulate the economy and to ameliorate the economy’s harsher effects 
through social welfare measures…The second great period of activism…is 
appropriately associated with the chief justiceship of Earl Warren…the Warren 
Court is in fact a fair shorthand for the peak period of extensive liberal activism 
that broadened, extended, and nationalized civil liberties and civil rights in 
America in mid-century (Lewis, 1-2). 
 
 As the years progressed, the term judicial activism began to be used mainly as an 
insult; it has become a pejorative term (Roosevelt 2006).  Since Schlesinger’s article 
other definitions of judicial activism have also surfaced.  Many scholars create their own 
definitions, which accounts for the substantial number that are available. Most of the 
definitions range from declaring acts of other governmental branches unconstitutional to 
result-oriented judging (Howard and Segal 2004; Brubaker 1984; Wolfe 1997; Kmiec 
2004).  
 The following definitions are a small sample of those that are currently in use.  
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, judicial activism is: “A philosophy of judicial 
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decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, among 
other factors, to guide their decisions, usu. with the suggestion that adherents of this 
philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing to ignore precedent.”  A 
common and oft repeated definition is, “The program of judicial activism holds that 
courts should void the decisions of the other branches of government whenever they 
offend the judges’ own sense of principles required by the Constitution, even though the 
decisions of the other branches were backed by admittedly reasonable understandings of 
the Constitution (Brubaker, 504).”   
 A different approach is provided by Christopher Wolfe, in his book Judicial 
Activism: Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Security?, whereby he creates the 
conventional model.  The conventional model can best be summarized with the 
following,  
Activism and restraint, therefore, cannot be reduced to the simple idea that activist 
judges ‘make law’ and restrained judges merely ‘interpret the Constitution.’ 
Inevitably, the differences between activism and restraint are more a question of 
degree than of kind.  Most simply put, the basic tenet of judicial activism is that 
judges ought to decide cases, not avoid them, and thereby use their power broadly 
to further justice – that is, to protect human dignity – especially by expanding 
equality and personal liberty.  Activist judges are committed to provide judicial 
remedies for a wide range of social wrongs and to use their power, especially the 
power to give content to general constitutional guarantees, to do so (Wolfe, 2-4). 
 
Wolfe's model appears to only take liberal activism into account. Liberal activism, 
occurring during the second period of activism, was described in the section on eras of 
activism. 
Some definitions are all-encompassing, such as the following:  “(1) invalidation 
of the arguably constitutional actions of other branches, (2) failure to adhere to precedent, 
(3) judicial “legislation,” (4) departures from accepted interpretive methodology, and (5) 
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result-oriented judging (Kmiec, 1444).” To avoid confusion, the following terms are 
associated with judicial activism: judicial rule-making and judicial legislation.  Some 
scholars have taken a different approach by defining activism in relation to a prior court. 
For example, “…three dimensions of the judicial activism of the Burger Court: its 
preservation of the activist landmark precedents of the Warren era, its willingness to 
invalidate acts of Congress, and its willingness to step into the breach of a constitutional 
crisis (Blasi, 201).” 
 The term judicial activism has become overused and, more importantly, a slight 
against the judge in question.  To expand on this point,  
We should consider the concept (activism) on its own terms, as ignoring the plain 
meaning of the Constitution in favor of the judge’s personal views.  Defined this 
way, ‘activist’ is just an insult.  In practice, it turns out to mean nothing more or 
less than that the decision is inconsistent with the speaker’s politics.  The label 
‘activist’ turns out to possess exactly the same fault it claims to identify in judges: 
it is entirely result-oriented (Roosevelt, 39). 
 
 After recognizing the faults with the term, Roosevelt considers whether or not a case is 
legitimate instead of activist, “A doctrine is legitimate…if the doctrinal rule it applies is a 
reasonable way to implement a reasonable understanding of the relevant constitutional 
meaning.  We should be asking…what reasons there are to think that the rule is a good 
way to achieve compliance with the underlying meaning (Roosevelt, 195).”  What this 
means is that many cases considered to be activist, such as Brown v. Board of Education 
and Roe v. Wade, are legitimate. 
 However, under the definitions previously provided almost any decision and/or 
judge can be labeled activist.  My provision of such a lengthy background on the topic is 
a testament to the fact that a variety of definitions exist.  Robert Howard and Jeffrey 
Segal closely mirror my own definition with the following,  
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The most gripping examples of judicial activism are decisions to declare 
unconstitutional laws of congress and the state legislatures.  The conflict between 
elected representatives and the appointed judiciary is most pronounced in these 
situations, and the Court’s decision is usually final.  Both justices and Courts may 
be defined as either activist or restraintist.  A restraintist justice (or Court) defers 
to the democratic majority and most often sustains the legislation.  An activist 
judge (or Court) is less deferential, and therefore less reticent about striking down 
such laws (Howard and Segal, 131). 
 
This leads into the clearly recognized standard, which is that: “…a consensus has 
emerged that the benchmark measure of judicial activism should be the invalidation of 
federal legislation (Lindquist and Cross, 48).”  Additionally, some scholars find the 
invalidation of federal laws to be the simplest and most direct way to analyze activism 
(Caldeira 1215).  Three different definitions have become the most prevalent: overturning 
a federal statute (which is cited most frequently), overturning a state statute, and 
overturning precedent (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Howard and 
Segal 2004; Caldeira 1986). 
What is needed is a definition that can be tested empirically.  Thus, for the 
purposes of this paper, an activist decision will be one that overturns a federal statute, a 
state statute, or alters precedent.  The decision to overturn a federal statute is more 
activist than overturning a state statute because, “Certainly, challenging the lawmaking 
authority of a coequal branch of government is among the most consequential acts the 
justices can perform and thus must take pride of place in any study of judicial 
activism…Less significant, but still important, are the justice’s decisions to invalidate the 
acts of the sovereign state governments (Lindquist and Cross, 34).”  I expect state statute 
activism averages to be much higher than federal statute activism averages because, 
"Over the course of its history, the states have occupied more of the Court's constitutional 
attention than has the federal government, and the states have been the primary target of 
 13
the power of judicial review (Whittington, 586)."  Overturning precedent is included 
since the, “Failure to follow precedent can disrupt an institutional settlement of disputed 
questions and leave the law in a state of uncertainty (Lindquist and Cross, 125).” 
 Having established a clear definition of what activism is, it is now necessary to 
discuss judicial ideology.  The argument could be made that a justice’s use of judicial 
activism depends strongly on his or her view of the Constitution.  If a justice views the 
Constitution as a living document than he or she is more apt to stray from precedent and 
thus be considered an activist.  Since the Constitution is an evolutionary document, 
precedent should not become a judicial straightjacket when it becomes clear that a new 
policy is in order.  If a justice views the Constitution along strict constructionist lines he 
or she should be less willing to break from precedent and should be viewed as an agent of 
self-restraint.  In fact, “…originalists (strict constructionists) tend to be political 
conservatives and living constitutionalists political liberals (Roosevelt, 49).”   
Though liberals are traditionally labeled activists, it is a term that can be applied 
to justices of both ideologies (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Keck 2004).  This is evident by 
the two separate activist movements, the first taking place beginning at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the second which occurred during Warren’s tenure (Lewis 1999).  
In fact, “…there are some very liberal justices who are activists, as well as some liberals 
who demonstrate restraint.  The same can be said of the conservative justices on the 
Court (Lindquist and Cross, 56).”  Although these justices differ in how they engage in 
activism, traditionally liberals protect civil liberties whereas conservatives protect 
business interests.   
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Thomas Keck analyzed each justice by the party of the appointing president and 
found that, “Supreme Court justices appointed by Republican presidents have been no 
more restrained than those appointed by Democrats.  They exercise judicial review just as 
frequently, and they are no more reluctant to enter political thickets (Keck, 286).”  This 
statement suggests that the inverse could be true as well; that justices appointed by a 
Republican president are no more activist than a justice appointed by a Democratic 
president.   
Prior to moving into the historical background, I would like to note that there has 
been little quantitative research performed on the topic.  Through my research, I found 
many articles on activism that were written between 1960 and 1980.  At this point I had 
not found any work that analyzed activism in a manner similar to how I study it.  That is 
until April of 2009 when Stephanie Lindquist and Frank Cross' book Measuring Judicial 
Activism was published.   After reading their work, I based my model on similar grounds; 
however, I did stray from it slightly.  This will be discussed at length in the methodology 
section.  I was able to find three older studies that quantitatively analyze activism.  The 
first I reviewed was by Robert Howard and Jeffrey Segal who researched Supreme Court 
Justices opportunities to grant review of cases between the 1985 and 1994 terms.  The 
filed briefs requested that the Supreme Court strike down a legislative act, ranging from 
federal laws to local ordinances.  In this case, judicial activism would occur if the court 
struck down a legislative act without a party requesting it do so.  The results show that, 
"...it is clear that the Court infrequently uses the power of judicial review to overturn 
legislation enacted by democratic majorities.  As our data show, the Court will not, 
absent a request, strike down legislation passed by states or the federal 
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government...(Howard and Segal 141)."  This suggests that the Court does not engage in 
activism unless requested to do so.  In the analysis I conducted I did not analyze if a party 
requested the Court to overturn a statute, I only measured whether or not a statute was 
overturned. 
The second study, by Jeffrey Segal and Robert Howard, measured judicial 
responses between the 1985 and 1994 terms to requests to overturn precedent, and 
whether or not their responses were determined by the ideological direction of the 
requestor.  Parties to a case rarely asked for precedent to be overturned, in fact, "In only 
37 cases (2.9 percent) did the petitioner ask the Court to overturn a precedent, and in only 
30 more (2.3 percent) did the respondent ask the same (Segal and Howard, 152)."  The 
results confirm that the decision to overturn precedent is related to the ideological 
direction of the party requesting stare decisis.  This is true especially with the following 
justices: Marshall, Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, and Ginsburg.  
Justices Scalia and Thomas, regardless of the requestor, did not support precedent (Segal 
and Howard 157).  In my research I did not analyze requests to alter precedent, I simply 
measured whether or not it was altered.  This is an interesting study that shows a 
connection between ideology and the decision to overturn precedent. 
In the third study, Stefanie Lindquist and Rorie Solberg measure which influences 
impact justice’s decisions to invalidate federal, state, or local laws for decisions that were 
considered to contain a constitutional challenge.  They analyzed data from the Burger 
Court, more specifically 1969 to 1985, and from the Rehnquist Court from 1986 to 2000.  
Lindquist and Solberg perform an extensive analysis on a variety of influences, such as, 
the position of the solicitor general and pressure from interest groups.  I will focus here 
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on the research they conducted regarding ideology and a justice’s decision to declare an 
act of the federal, state or local government unconstitutional.  They find that for the 
Rehnquist Court, “…liberals (are) more likely to strike state statutes and conservatives 
(are) more likely to strike federal statutes…and…conservatives and liberals are almost 
equally likely to vote ideologically in choosing to strike both state and federal legislation 
(Lindquist and Solberg, 86).”    However, the Burger Court does not follow this pattern, 
restraintist conservatives were less likely than liberals to overturn federal and state 
legislation even when ideology was factored in (Lindquist and Solberg 86).  Their results 
for the Rehnquist Court, in particular liberals striking state statutes and conservatives 
striking federal statutes, match mine. 
 17
 
Historical Background 
The Warren Court 1953-1969 
Chief Justice Earl Warren was appointed by President Eisenhower and was sworn 
into office on October 5, 1953 and left office on June 23, 1969. Warren joined the 
following associate justices onto the court: Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, 
William Douglas, Robert Jackson, Harold Burton, Tom Clark, and Sherman Minton.  Of 
these eight men already present on the bench, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed 
five.  Several of these men he served a limited amount of time with, such as Robert 
Jackson who left the court in 1954 and Sherman Minton who left in 1956.  He also served 
with several associate justices who took the oath of office while he was the Chief Justice.   
They are: John Harlan, William Brennan, Charles Whittaker, Potter Stewart, Byron 
White, Arthur Goldberg, Abe Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall, though his time with 
Marshall was brief as he was appointed in 1967.  In order to show a more complete 
timeline of the Warren Court, I have provided table I that shows when a justice was 
appointed to the court, when he or she left the court (unless he or she served until after 
Warren left office, which will then be left blank), the appointing President and his party. 
Nowhere in Warren’s resume was there any judicial position; however, he had an 
extensive career in politics.  In fact, he served as Governor of California for three terms 
and in 1948 was the vice presidential nominee for the Republican Party (Belknap 1).  
With this type of background, how was he selected to be the Chief Justice of the United 
States?  It is not entirely without merit to rule out patronage,  
Warren directed the California campaign for the Republican ticket, and after its 
prospects had been dimmed by September revelations that Ike’s running mate, 
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Senator Richard Nixon, had been the beneficiary of a secret slush fund, he made a 
television appearance and numerous speeches on behalf of the GOP 
nominees…Although the two men (Eisenhower and Warren) had not had much 
personal contact, Eisenhower greatly respected Warren and was clearly in his debt 
(Belknap, 5).  
 
This suggests that regardless of whether or not he was qualified for the position, he was 
selected as repayment for his previous political favor. 
Table I:  
J ust ice
Y ea r tha t 
J udicia l Oa th 
w a s Ta ken
Y ea r J ust ice 
L eft  C ou rt
A ppo int ing  
P resi dent
Pa rty of  
P resid ent
B lack, H ug o 19 3 7 Roo sev elt, F . D emo crat
R eed, Stanl ey 19 3 8 19 5 7 Roo sev elt, F . D emo crat
F ran kfur ter , F elix 19 3 9 19 6 2 Roo sev elt, F . D emo crat
D o ug las, W ill iam 19 3 9 Roo sev elt, F . D emo crat
J ackso n , Ro ber t 19 4 1 19 5 4 Roo sev elt, F . D emo crat
B urto n, H aro ld 19 4 5 19 5 8 Tru man D emo crat
C lark, T o m 19 4 9 19 6 7 Tru man D emo crat
M in to n, Sherman 19 4 9 19 5 6 Tru man D emo crat
H arlan , J oh n 19 5 5 Eis enh ow er Rep ub lican
B ren nan , W illiam 19 5 6 Eis enh ow er Rep ub lican
W hi ttaker , C har les 19 5 7 19 6 2 Eis enh ow er Rep ub lican
S tew art, Po tter 19 5 8 Eis enh ow er Rep ub lican
W hi te, By ron 19 6 2 K enn edy D emo crat
G o ld berg, A rth u r 19 6 2 19 6 5 K enn edy D emo crat
F ortas, A be 19 6 5 M ay, 19 69 Jo hn so n, L. D emo crat
M arsh all, Th urg oo d 19 6 7 Jo hn so n, L. D emo crat  
 
Chief Justice Warren, while addressing an audience at the University of 
Michigan, claimed that, “conformity is no special virtue.  Sometimes nonconformity is 
exactly the antidote needed to remedy a situation (quoted in Pollack, 181).”  These 
words, spoken in 1955, encompassed his tenure and legacy on the Supreme Court 
perfectly.  He became a hotbed of controversy.  The conservatives rued the day that he 
was appointed to the Court, yet he was a pleasant surprise for liberals who did not expect 
Source: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
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this from a Republican presidential appointee.  Pollack, in his book Earl Warren: The 
Judge Who Changed America, terms this the Warren paradox, which is: 
Eisenhower had appointed him to the Chief Justiceship largely because the 
President believed him to be a high-level mediocrity.  Everything about Warren 
seemed to indicate that his role on the Court would be that of an unimaginative 
moderate-conservative conformist.  His loyalty to the President and the 
Republican Party, together with his politician’s instinct for trying to be all things 
to all men, would surely prevent him from doing anything likely to cause 
problems for the Administration…Then, with the desegregation decision of May 
1954, the astonishing reversal began.  Liberals and conservatives alike were 
stunned; the embarrassed President was enraged.  Gentle, soft-spoken Earl 
Warren was not only beginning to behave like a ‘radical-activist liberal,’ but was 
doing so with such apparent disregard for the social and political consequences of 
his actions that he was throwing the nation into turmoil (Pollack, 12-3). 
 
Chief Justice Warren was a complex person.  This quote conveys the message that at 
some point during his transition from governor to chief justice his ideology changed.  
The desegregation decision referred to was Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Kansas (1954).  In order to showcase the Court’s activism, I have selected four 
cases that best encompass the Court’s overall reach, this decision of course being one of 
them.  Separate but equal as a concept had been established by the Supreme Court 
decision Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).  Since then, the Court had reaffirmed it at least seven 
times in addition to Congress’ reaffirmation of it at least one hundred times.  The Court 
changed course under Warren in the controversial decision Brown v. Board, recognizing 
that separate but equal violated the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.  
Colored children were required to attend segregated schools that were further from their 
homes than the schools attended by white children.  So, the parents of the colored 
students filed a class action suit requesting that racial segregation be reversed.  The Court 
voted unanimously to overturn separate but equal in education broadly and Plessy v. 
Ferguson specifically (Pollack 172-6).  This decision was activist in at least two ways: it 
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overturned precedent and essentially created legislation, since this was not the will of the 
legislature. 
Next, Miranda v. Arizona (1966) serves as a great example of Warren Court 
activism, especially considering the number of cases decided with respect to the rights of 
criminals.  Ernesto Miranda signed a confession statement at the time of his arrest 
admitting to both the kidnap and rape of a young woman and that he had full knowledge 
of his legal rights.  This was not accurate: his attorney argued that he was never informed 
of his right to remain silent and had not signed the confession either voluntarily or with 
knowledge of his rights (Pollack 267).  In a 5-4 decision the Court found that, “The 
correct rule of procedure…is that the police must clearly inform any suspect of his right 
to remain silent immediately upon apprehension, and the suspect must have his lawyer 
present before he can be questioned.  If the suspect indicates that he wishes to remain 
silent, all interrogation must stop.  Since these conditions had not been fulfilled in 
Miranda’s case, his conviction was overturned (Pollack, 268).”  At the time of the 
decision there was a great outcry from Congress and from law enforcement officials.  
Congress went so far as to create the “Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
which, among other things, specified that confessions are admissible in Federal courts if 
given voluntarily.  In state prosecutions, however, the provisions of Miranda necessarily 
had to remain in full effect (Pollack, 269).”  This is another example of judge-made law.   
The Court also heavily emphasized religion, with Engel v. Vitale (1962) being the 
most colorful example.  In 1962, the Court, in a 6 to 1 decision, struck down compulsory 
prayer in school as being inconsistent with the establishment clause.  The New York 
Board of Regents drafted the following invocation to be read in public schools, 
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“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings 
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country (Urofsky, 142).”  The argument of the 
Court can best be understood by the following, “The nature of prayer itself is religious, 
and by promoting prayer, the state violated the establishment clause by fostering a 
religious activity that it determined and sponsored (Urofsky, 143).”  It was necessary for 
the Court to intervene here since government was promoting one religion at the expense 
of others.  The public outcry following the decision was extreme.  For example, “This 
decision aroused a nationwide hurricane of protests from religionists, legislators and 
parents who wanted their children to secure religious instruction in the schools.  Not 
since the 1954 school desegregation ruling had the Warren Court been condemned so 
bitterly (Pollack, 210-11).”  Even former President Eisenhower, the man who appointed 
Warren to the bench, lost faith in the institution and called it the Godless Supreme Court.  
The Court seemed to be the only governmental branch willing to stand by the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution.  Although this decision is 
activist for denouncing compulsory student prayer of the New York Board of Regents, it 
is hard for some to separate the first amendment issue from their own personal religious 
beliefs. 
The Warren Court was faced with a catch 22 in regards to religion.  The American 
people were quickly becoming more religious.  However, the various sects of religion 
created a great divide between the people (Belknap 130-1).  In fact,  
The theoretically unrepresentative Supreme Court, however, actually reflected the 
popular will more accurately than did its critics in the political branches.  The 
Court’s decisions outraged those who wanted government to promote religion, but 
in a nation that was becoming increasingly diverse and divided religiously, there 
was no consensus concerning what faith government should foster.  Ultimately, 
the only policy that could command the support of a majority of the American 
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people was governmental neutrality toward religion, a concept the Warren Court 
sought, not always successfully, to embody in its decisions interpreting the First 
Amendment.  Although often accused of hostility toward religion, the Supreme 
Court was merely accommodating constitutional law to religious pluralism 
(Belknap, 130). 
 
Considering the different religious preferences available, the Court took the path that 
should have pleased the populace the most.  Instead, it helped lead to the New Rights 
uprising in the following decades, causing the later, and more sympathetic, courts to see 
an increase in cases involving religion.  
The final case that best encapsulates the Court is Mapp v. Ohio (1961).  
Considering the Court’s focus on criminal procedure, this is a good example of its 
interpretation of the fourth amendment.  Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing 
pornographic material after an unlawful search and seizure.  Police were attempting to 
find a bombing suspect in addition to paraphernalia related to gambling.  The police 
never procured a warrant, although they had ample time to do so.  The Ohio Supreme 
Court did not address the search and seizure aspect of the case; instead it focused on 
whether or not the state’s statute restricting the possession of obscenity violated the First 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court followed suit.  The ACLU had provided an amicus 
curiae brief that addressed seized evidence and how it should be excluded if seized 
unconstitutionally (Belknap 228-9).  Seizing on this, Douglas, Clark, Warren, Brennan, 
Stewart and Black (though Black, Douglas, and Stewart wrote concurring opinions) were 
able to create a majority opinion that would, “…apply the Fourth Amendment with full 
force to the states and make the exclusionary rule part and parcel of the constitutional 
guarantee (Belknap, 229).”  This decision caused dissension in the court for two main 
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reasons: 1) It overturned Wolf, and 2) The dissenters found this to be an unnecessary step 
to take since many states were moving in this direction already (Belknap 230). 
 
The Burger Court 1969-1986 
 Chief Justice Warren Burger was appointed to his position by President Nixon on 
June 23, 1969 and left the Court on September 26, 1986.  Burger joined the following 
associate justices on the court: Hugo Black, William Douglas, John Harlan, William 
Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White, and Thurgood Marshall.  Of all the seated justices, 
he only served two years with both Justice Black and Justice Harlan.  He also served with 
several associate justices who took the oath of office while he was the Chief Justice.  
They are: Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, and 
Sandra Day O’Connor. In order to show a more complete timeline of the Burger Court, I 
have provided table II for the Burger Court that shows when a justice was appointed to 
the court, when he or she left the court (unless he or she served until after Burger left 
office, which will then be left blank), the appointing President, and his party.  
Nixon had made the Supreme Court a large issue in his 1968 presidential 
campaign.  He went far on this point and, “…pledged to appoint justices who shared his 
strict constructionist approach to the Constitution, and Reagan and his legal advisers 
carried this effort even further, systematically vetting judicial candidates on a series of 
ideological grounds (Keck, 157).”  Reagan only made one appointment, Sandra Day 
O’Connor, to the Supreme Court during Burger’s tenure.  Yet he had pledged to appoint a 
woman to the Supreme Court so this comment really applies more to Scalia and 
Kennedy, who entered during Rehnquist’s chief justiceship.  The Burger Court had big 
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shoes to fill.  President Nixon appointed Burger to carry out his agenda, which was a very 
tall order.  In fact, “Burger was a known critic of the Warren jurisprudence, and he was 
appointed by President Nixon, whose concern about activist judges was a feature of his 
1968 campaign.  The so-called Burger agenda was projected to be, at least by many Court 
observers, a counterrevolution against the Warren revolution (O’Hara, 3).”  Was Nixon’s 
mission fulfilled?  Not according to Alpheus Mason, who claimed that, “During his first 
term, President Nixon made four appointments, including a chief justice.  Yet, even with 
a nucleus of support carried over from the Warren Court, his pledge remains unfulfilled 
(Mason, 35).” 
Table II: 
 
However, there are times when an associate justice has more sway and swagger than a 
Chief Justice.  Justice Brennan fit this profile.  He has been considered one of the most 
influential justices of all time for many reasons but mainly for his persuasive abilities.  
Because of this, he was still able to direct the outcome of a decision in the way he saw fit 
for many important cases, even under the chief justiceship of Warren Burger (Henry 28).  
Justice
Year that Judicial 
Oath was Taken
Year Justice 
Left Court
Appointing 
President
Party of 
President
Black, Hugo 1937 1971 Roosevelt, F. Democrat
Douglas, William 1939 1975 Roosevelt, F. Democrat
Harlan, John 1955 1971 Eisenhower Republican
Brennan, William 1956 Eisenhower Republican
Stewart, Potter 1958 1981 Eisenhower Republican
White, Byron 1962 Kennedy Democrat
Marshall, Thurgood 1967 Johnson, L. Democrat
Blackmun, Harry 1970 Nixon Republican
Powell, Lewis 1972 Nixon Republican
Rehnquist, William 1972 Nixon Republican
Stevens, John Paul 1975 Ford Republican
O'Connor, Sandra Day 1981 Reagan Republican
Source: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf. 
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He was so persuasive and important on the Court that he was able to keep afloat many of 
the issues of the previous Warren Court.  To summarize, “Rather than ending with 
Warren’s retirement, the rights revolution continued in full bloom even as conservatives 
joined the Court.  For this reason, some scholars have suggested that the transition from 
the Warren to the Burger era was relatively inconsequential, and that we might instead 
think of the whole period from roughly 1962 to 1981 as ‘the Brennan Court’ (Keck, 
133).”  This statement seems to claim that Justice Brennan single-handedly kept the 
rights revolution alive.  It would certainly appear that Justice Brennan was more 
influential than Chief Justice Burger.  
The Court has been labeled both activist and a counter-revolution that wasn’t.  
Robert Henry claims that, “…the Burger Court was unquestionably an activist Court.  
Admittedly, that activism was pragmatic, balanced, ad hoc – indeed rootless – or perhaps 
we might say that the activism was not grounded in any kind of common vision (Henry, 
30).”  In order to showcase the activism of the Burger Court I selected three decisions: 
Roe v. Wade (1973), U.S. v. Nixon (1974), and Furman v. Georgia (1972). 
 Roe v. Wade is arguably one of the most activist decisions made in the history of 
the Supreme Court.  This 7-2 decision provoked a conservative movement whose goal 
was to overturn Roe almost instantly.  In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun relied 
heavily on “the right to privacy” which has no constitutional basis.  This right was 
established in the decision Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which struck down a 
Connecticut statute that banned the sale of contraceptives to married couples.  Roe 
created a three-stage process for pregnant women that allowed a woman the opportunity 
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for abortion up until the viability of the fetus, and then allowed state intervention since it 
has a compelling interest (Garrow 87).   
 Many observers of the court were outraged by its decision to step into a “state’s 
rights issue.”  These critics may have a point, especially considering that prior to Roe; in 
July of 1970, a new law, which actually repealed the previous statute regarding abortion, 
in New York State was passed that allowed any woman who could afford the procedure 
to have an abortion on request.  Later the same year, similar measures were taken in 
Washington State when a referendum, adopted by popular vote, repealed the previous 
abortion statute (Garrow 85).  As one can see, the nation was beginning a trend to 
liberalize its abortion laws.  In Washington especially, the general populace was the one 
who initiated the action to legalize abortion.  This should serve as an indication of how 
Americans felt about abortion at the time.  Gerald Rosenberg summarizes the stance of 
the states best, “…in the five or so years prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions, reform 
and repeal bills had been debated in most states, and seventeen plus the District of 
Columbia acted to liberalize their laws.  State action had removed some obstacles to 
abortion, and safe and legal abortions were thus available in scattered states (Rosenberg, 
398).”  In a sense, through its intervention, the Supreme Court created a problem that is 
raging still to this day. 
 The Court handled an innovative case when it decided U.S. v. Nixon, which called 
into question executive privilege.    The President recorded audio taken in the Oval Office 
and then refused to allow other governmental branches (including the courts) to hear the 
tapes, claiming immunity.  In a unanimous decision (with only 8 justices voting, 
Rehnquist recused himself) the court declared that even the President of the United States 
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must obey subpoenas.  The case also, “…held for the first time that the president of the 
United States can be made a party defendant in a federal lawsuit (Blasi, 207).”  There is 
something unique about this case; it is the speed in which it went through the judicial 
process.  The case completely skipped the United States Court of Appeals.  It is important 
to note that Congress was in the impeachment process.  Had the case proceeded as usual, 
instead of on an expedited track, Congress would have impeached the President and have 
earned back much of its legitimacy from the public (Blasi 200-1).  Blasi claims that, 
“United States v. Nixon represents nothing less than a bold and stunningly successful 
instance of judicial activism (Blasi, 201).” 
 The Court declared what punishments it saw fit in Furman v. Georgia, which 
dealt with a state capital punishment law that selected recipients of the death penalty in 
an arbitrary (and racist) fashion.  Here, Furman, a black man accidentally murdered a 
homeowner during an attempt to rob a home. The case dealt with the eighth amendment 
right against cruel and unusual punishment.  In a 5-4 decision the Court inserted itself in 
a moral argument regarding the death penalty. Because of the decision, “…the Burger 
Court held unconstitutional the death penalty as then administered in all the states (Blasi, 
213).”  The decision was a short per curiam opinion, but the real meat lies within the 
many concurrences filed.  A shining example by Justice Brennan uses the following to 
claim that the death penalty in all instances is inconsistent with the eighth amendment: 
In sum, the punishment of death is inconsistent with all four principles: Death is 
an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability that it 
is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and 
there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than 
the less severe punishment of imprisonment.  The function of these principles is to 
enable a court to determine whether a punishment comports with human dignity.  
Death, quite simply, does not (Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).   
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Though there are some truths to this opinion, it is hard to believe that contemporary 
society almost virtually rejects the death penalty, considering how much debate still 
lingers on the topic to this day.  Considering the fact that, “…the majority of state 
legislatures responded to the decision by reaffirming their commitment to capital 
punishment and devising systems for administering the death penalty in a more consistent 
fashion (Blasi, 213).”  This decision, though activist, forced the hand of the state in a 
positive fashion by making states more predictable and less arbitrary in who was given 
the death penalty. 
The Rehnquist Court 1986-2005 
 Chief Justice William Rehnquist was first appointed to the court by President 
Nixon in 1972, and was then elevated to the position of chief justice by President Reagan 
on September 26, 1986.  Rehnquist died in office on September 3, 2005.  Rehnquist 
joined the following associate justices on the court: William Brennan, Byron White, 
Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra Day 
O’Connor.  Of all the sitting justices, he only served a brief time (while he was chief 
justice) with Lewis Powell who left the court in 1987. He also served with several 
associate justices who took the oath of office while he was the chief justice.  They are: 
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. In order to show a more complete timeline of the 
Rehnquist Court, I have provided table III that shows when a justice was appointed to the 
court, when he or she left the court (unless he or she served until after Rehnquist left 
office, which will then be left blank), the appointing President, and his party. 
 29
Table III: 
 
 Rehnquist was known as a strict constructionist, a legal doctrine that helped him 
first ascend to the bench and then to elevate to the position of chief justice.  According to  
Thomas Keck, “As soon as he took his seat on the bench in 1972, for example, Rehnquist 
became the Court’s leading advocate of both judicial restraint and a fixed conception of 
the written constitution (Keck, 115).”  Being an advocate of judicial restraint should have 
meant that he would let the court defer to other branches of government; however, the 
Rehnquist Court found more federal statutes to be unconstitutional than any other 
Supreme Court.  Figure IV addresses the numbers for the Warren through the Rehnquist 
Courts. 
Figure IV: 
Decisions Striking Down Federal Statutes on Constitutional Grounds
Historical Period Years Number Annual Average
Early Warren Court 1954-1962 7 0.78
Late Warren Court 1963-1969 16 2.29
Burger Court 1969-1986 32 1.88
Early Rehnquist Court 1986-1994 7 0.78
Late Rehnquist Court 1995-2003 33 3.67
Source: Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist  Supreme Court in History: The Road to Judicial 
Conservativism .  Modified table by removing Early Court through Roosevelt Court.  
Justice
Year that Judicial 
Oath was Taken
Year Justice 
Left Court
Appointing 
President
Party of 
President
Brennan, William 1956 1990 Eisenhower Republican
White, Byron 1962 1993 Kennedy Democrat
Marshall, Thurgood 1967 1991 Johnson, L. Democrat
Blackmun, Harry 1970 1994 Nixon Republican
Powell, Lewis 1972 1987 Nixon Republican
Stevens, John Paul 1975 Ford Republican
O'Connor, Sandra Day 1981 Reagan Republican
Scalia, Antonin 1986 Reagan Republican
Kennedy, Anthony 1988 Reagan Republican
Souter, David 1990 Bush, G.H.W. Republican
Thomas, Clarence 1991 Bush, G.H.W. Republican
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader 1993 Clinton Democrat
Breyer, Stephen 1994 Clinton Democrat
Source: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf. 
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 By combining the two Warren Court rows the total becomes 23 overturned federal 
statutes, while the Rehnquist Court had an astonishing 40 overturned federal statutes.  
The totals for the two conservative courts shown both outnumber that of the liberal 
Warren Court. For this, among other reasons, Thomas Keck, in his book The Most 
Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to Modern Judicial Conservativism, found 
the Rehnquist Court to be the most activist.  The Rehnquist Court, however, fell behind 
the Burger and Warren Courts, respectively, as figure V shows with the number of state 
and local statutes overturned. 
Figure V: 
 
Here, the Rehnquist Court only overturned 128 statutes, while the Warren Court 
overturned 186.  However, the Warren Court falls significantly behind the Burger Court, 
which overturned a surprising 309 statutes.  
 The public, as well as many scholars, had assumed that the conservative 
Rehnquist Court would overturn the liberal activism of the Warren Court; this was not the 
case.  Instead,  
When Reagan elevated Rehnquist to chief justice in 1986, most scholars assumed 
that the conservative Court would abandon liberal activism and replace it with 
Decisions Striking Down State and Local Statutes on Constitutional Grounds
Historical Period Years Number Annual Average
Early Warren Court 1954-1962 73 8.11
Late Warren Court 1963-1969 113 16.14
Burger Court 1969-1986 309 18.18
Early Rehnquist Court 1986-1994 85 10.63
Late Rehnquist Court 1995-2003 43 4.78
Source: Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to Judicial Conservativism.  
Modified table by removing Early Court through Roosevelt Court.
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restraint, just as they had expected when Rehnquist first joined the bench in 1972.  
By the early 1990s, it seemed more likely that the conservative justices would 
abandon liberal activism not for restraint but instead for their own conservative 
activism.  As it happened, however, neither of these alternatives came to pass.  
Instead, the justices with the deciding votes endorsed the newer conservative 
activism, but in a move that produced a sharp conflict with their conservative 
colleagues, they continued to reaffirm much of the Court’s liberal activism as well 
(Keck, 157). 
 
When looking at the Rehnquist Court, one has to take into account the effect that Justices 
Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy had on the Court.  Keck claims that, “Since 
their votes are so often decisive, moreover, it is O’Connor’s and Kennedy’s vision of the 
judicial role – their particular effort to reconcile the long-standing conservative 
commitment to restraint and the New Right commitment to limited government – that 
explains the extraordinary activism of the Rehnquist Court (Keck, 203).” O’Connor’s 
somewhat moderate approaches to cases, such as her undue burden test in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, have shown her willingness to limit the reach of her activism in 
either a liberal or conservative manner.  More important however, is the bargaining 
position that O’Connor and Kennedy are in when it comes to split votes.  They would 
have the ability to have the other justices give concessions for them to join the majority, 
which normally is not the case.   
In order to showcase the Court’s activism, I have selected three cases that best 
encompass the Court’s overall reach, they are: Bush v. Gore (2000), Lee v. Weisman 
(1992), and Lawrence v. Texas (2003).  The 2000, 5-4, Bush v. Gore decision is well 
known to Americans as handing the presidency to George W. Bush by halting the recount 
voting in Florida.  The background of the case can be summed up with the following:  
Late at night on December 11, the Court issued its opinion, holding that the 
application of different standards to determine the intent of the voter violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.  A recount with consistent standards, the opinion 
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suggested, would be constitutionally permissible.  But Florida law, the Court 
asserted, required final submission of the results by December 12.  Since it was 
plainly impossible to complete a statewide recount with consistent standards by 
that date, the Court’s opinion also stated that no further recount was permissible 
(Roosevelt, 191). 
 
The conservative justification for deciding the case in the manner it did was known to 
few people, “Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist’s justification for stopping the Florida 
recounts was rooted in a reading of the original constitutional text - Article II, 
§1…(Keck, 267).”  However, the Supreme Court should not have been the body to 
decide this case; the legislature should have.  The House of Representatives had already 
decided three elections, 1800, 1824, and 1876, though the 1876 dispute was resolved by a 
committee of members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate as well as 
Justices of the Supreme Court (Heumann and Cassak 163-4).  Due to the result of the 
1876 election, the Electoral Count Act was created.  The Act “…does place responsibility 
for resolving electoral disputes in Congress.  Congress considered delegating the task to 
the Supreme Court but decided against it (Heumann and Cassak, 165, my emphasis).” 
 Even defenders of Bush v. Gore considered it an activist decision.  Richard Posner 
claimed that, “Bush v. Gore is an activist decision...The Court thrust itself boldly into the 
center of a political struggle…The three most conservative Justices dusted off a forgotten 
provision of the Constitution…and gave it a meaning very likely unintended by the 
Constitution’s framers, whom conservative lawyers and judges tend to venerate to the 
point of idolatry (quoted in Keck, 267).”  This decision was a special brand of activism 
considering its notoriety and reach (an eight year presidential term).  The Court 
effectively ignored the congressional remedy, usurping its power, and “…had the effect 
of overturning the laws of thirty-seven states (which like Florida, used a ballot-counting 
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standard emphasizing the intent of the voter), laws that had long existed and long been 
unchallenged, on behalf of a dubious interpretation of the original Constitution (Keck, 
252).” With a system that no longer emphasized the intent of the voter, many states had 
to change their ballot system entirely.  I can only assume that this would mean the end for 
the hanging and dimpled chads as well as other antiquated methods of voting.  The 
decision also wounded the reputation of the Court: “Had the Supreme Court left the 
election to be settled in Congress, we might have had a more satisfying resolution.  We 
would, at any rate, have had the decision made by officials that voters could hold to 
account.  Bush v. Gore was an unfortunate over-reaction to perceived judicial activism, a 
self-inflicted wound for the Supreme Court (Roosevelt, 198).”  The accountability issue 
cannot be overstated.  Citizens are unable to hold justices accountable and because of this 
decision they had no other option but to wait out the presidential term of George W. 
Bush. 
 In Lee v. Weisman, a 5-4 split decision, organized prayer at public school 
graduations was prohibited because the invocation violated the establishment clause.  
Scalia dissented claiming that this decision was, “…a clear usurpation of popular 
authority for the Court to invalidate this broad tradition – not to mention the ‘more 
specific traditions of invocations and benedictions at public school graduation exercises’ 
themselves (Keck, 169).”  This case is reminiscent of Engel v. Vitale in that the Court is 
again protecting citizens from a message that may be against their religious beliefs.  The 
similarities end when one considers that in Engel there was only one vote in opposition 
and in Lee there was only a majority by one vote.  However, considering the reach this 
case has, the decision may not have been the best possible resolution, especially since, 
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“The government now presides over many significant events, such as public high school 
graduations, which believers wish to solemnize with religious ceremonies.  Prohibiting 
essentially all official prayer at public school events because of the danger of coercion 
might be striking the wrong balance (Roosevelt, 148-9).”  The religious right was stunned 
by this decision considering the composition of the Court.  However, in instances like this 
one, where a large body will be receiving the message, it is imperative not to sponsor one 
particular religion.       
 Lawrence v. Texas is proof that the Rehnquist Court engages in liberal activism as 
well as conservative activism.  Here, police entered the home of Lawrence due to a 
weapons disturbance and found him engaging in a sexual act with another man; the two 
were then arrested.  In this case, the Supreme Court struck down the state statute that 
criminalized same-sex sodomy.  As has been previously mentioned, Kennedy and 
O’Connor are the justices crucial to the outcome of a decision, and this case proved to be 
no exception.  Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in this case, while O’Connor wrote 
her own concurring opinion.  Kennedy wrote that,   
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to 
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a 
person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to 
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines 
of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another 
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons 
the right to make this choice (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).   
 
Although this decision, and these comments, surprised many, O’Connor’s opinion helped 
to limit the Court’s reach: “… O’Connor supported the Court’s liberal activism in the 
sodomy case…She voted to strike down Texas’s sodomy statute, but wrote separately to 
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limit the reach of the Court’s rationale (Keck, 200).”  This case was activist in two ways: 
it overturned a state statute and it overturned the Court’s own precedent Bowers v. 
Hardwick when the Court sustained the Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy 
regardless of the sex of both participants.  This historical background provides enough 
information to allow me to move forward into the methodology section. 
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Methodology 
 With respect to the "unit of analysis" issue, it is important to note that activism is 
a justice-based phenomenon.  The attention is normally drawn to courts instead of 
individual justices who comprise the courts.  However, Stefanie Lindquist and Frank 
Cross in Measuring Judicial Activism analyze individual justices.  I decided to base my 
model on similar grounds.  Their work does not go far enough nor look at other important 
factors.  They analyze natural courts which I believe eliminates important justices, who 
although had a brief tenure, made decisions on the bench.  By natural court I mean the 
period of time when a court sees no additions or subtractions.  An example of a natural 
court is the Rehnquist Court after the addition of Stephen Breyer but before the 
retirement of O’Connor and the death of Rehnquist.  They also look at aspects of activism 
that I would not include, namely overturning regulatory agency actions and executive 
actions.  In their work, they mention on numerous occasions that overturning federal 
precedent is the most extreme action of all those possible toward statutes (over states or 
local governments for example).  At the end of their research they weigh it equally with 
all other measured factors, which I believe is an error since they gave it special attention 
and set it apart from the other forms of activism.  
I, along with Lindquist and Cross (2009), used a database provided by Harold 
Spaeth (2009).  I used the Original U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database (nickname: 
ALLCOURT).    First, I imported the ASCII version of Spaeth’s database and then 
opened it with Excel.  This caused a small importation error; every concurrence or dissent 
with either Justice Harlan, Justice Fortas, Justice Thomas, or a jurisdictional dissent, 
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caused the numerical value in the column to be read as an increment of time.  I 
maintained a separate base file and made separate sheets for each individual justice.  I 
then removed all cases that did not receive full opinions (such as per curiam opinions, 
etc.) and I also removed duplicative cases.  This filtering left 409 occurrences from the 
importation error, which I manually checked.  First, I used the Lawyer’s Edition of the 
United States Reports (LED) citation, since it was present on every case on Lexis Nexus 
Law in order to find the case name.  Then I used this case name and citation (verifying 
every case with the decision date and party descriptions) on oyez.org to find how each 
justice voted in the case.  This worked in every instance and the case names and citations 
are provided in Appendix I.  Then after adding back in the correct data in those 409 
instances, I used the TERM column, which begins with the 1953 term, to analyze every 
year the justice was on the bench.   
I analyzed the direction of the decision variable for each decision and whether or 
not a justice was in the majority to decide ideology.  For example, if the direction was 
coded as liberal and the justice was in the majority then he or she decided it as a liberal.  
For every justice, I calculated the number of times he or she was in the liberal majority 
and the number of times he or she was in the conservative majority.  A justice is coded as 
liberal if the difference between the number of times he or she voted with the liberal 
majority versus the conservative majority is greater than 50.  A justice is coded as 
conservative if the difference between the number of times he or she voted with the 
conservative majority versus the liberal majority is greater than 50.  If there are less than 
50 decisions separating the two totals, the justice is labeled a moderate.  I used 50 so that 
I could have three distinct groups.  Figure VI describes Spaeth’s coding scheme in detail.  
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In Spaeth's database, an alteration of precedent occurs when the majority opinion claims 
to overrule a former opinion.  Simply distinguishing precedent is not considered by 
Spaeth to be an alteration of precedent. 
Figure VI 
In order to determine whether an outcome is liberal (=1) or conservative (=0), the 
following scheme is employed:
In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, 
privacy, and attorneys
1=
pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial
pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil liberties (e.g., 
homosexuality)
pro-child or juvenile
pro-indigent
pro-Indian
pro-affirmative action
pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases
pro-female in abortion
pro-underdog
anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-
owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business
violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresidents
pro-attorney
pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending
pro-privacy vis-à-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetent
pro-jurisdiction in 506
pro-disclosure in 537 issues except for employment and student records
0=
Reverse of above
In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity
1=
pro-union except in union antitrust where 1 = pro-competition
anti-business
anti-employer
pro-competition
pro-liability
pro-injured person
pro-indigent
pro-small business vis-à-vis large business
pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases
pro-debtor
pro-bankrupt
pro-Indian
pro-environmental protection
pro-economic underdog
pro-consumer
pro-accountability in governmental corruption
anti-union member or employee vis-à-vis union
anti-union in union antitrust
anti-union in union or closed shop
pro-trial in arbitration
0=
Reverse of above
In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power
1=
pro-exercise of judicial power
pro-judicial "activism"
pro-judicial review of administrative action
0=
Reverse of above
In the context of issues pertaining to federalism
1=
pro-federal power
anti-state
0=
Reverse of above
In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation
1=
pro-United States
0=
pro-taxpayer  
Source: The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database 1953-2007 Terms by Harold 
Spaeth (http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/allcourt_codebook.pdf).
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From this I was able to provide an average on federal statute activism, state 
statute activism, and overturning precedent activism.  I was then able to look at every 
justice who served on the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts and establish an overall 
activist average by averaging all of his or her annual activism totals.  Two different chart 
types appear below: 1) a bar chart with overall activism averages, and 2) a line chart with 
the annual averages of the conservative and liberal justices. 
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Findings 
Federal statute activism 
 The total activism averages are relatively low during the Warren and Burger 
years, the highest averages belonging to Justice Fortas with an average of 2.2%, Justice 
Goldberg with a 2.1% average (these inflated percentages are partially due to their brief 
tenure on the Court), and Justice Black's 1.1% average.  I include Justice Black's average 
because his number is more realistic due to the 18 terms analyzed as opposed to Justice 
Fortas' four terms and Justice Goldberg's three terms.  I consider it a low average when a 
justice's score is below the average.  For this type of activism, the average of all justice's 
scores is 0.9%.  Figure VII shows the overall activism average for all justices of the three 
courts.  The rest of the averages hover between half of a percent and a percent.  A surge 
begins with Justice O'Connor, who barely tops the average with 1.1%, but the numbers 
reach a high point with Justice Thomas's 2.1% average.  As one can see, the majority of 
the justices who have scores higher than the average served on the Rehnquist Court.   
The political party of the appointing president is an insufficient indicator as the 
sole means of explaining judicial ideology.  Consider how often a justice has changed his 
or her position while serving on the bench.  For this reason, I included the number of 
times each justice was within the liberal majority as well as the conservative one.  For 
example, a Democrat appointed Justice Black, but it is the number of times he voted with 
the liberal majority (over three times that of the conservative majority) that is important.  
Therefore, I formatted each justice so that it is apparent with which majority he or she 
voted.  If the justice's name is in bold than he or she voted with the liberal majority most 
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frequently; the justice's name appears in italics if he or she voted with the conservative 
majority most frequently.  If a justice's name has no special formatting than he or she is 
moderate.  I considered a justice moderate if there were less than 50 votes that separated 
his or her liberal and conservative majority totals.  The justices with an average of over 
2.0% all voted strongly with the party of the appointing president (Fortas and Goldberg, 
appointed by Democrats voted with the liberal majority and Thomas, appointed by a 
Republican voted with the conservative majority).  One member of the Rehnquist Court 
voted with both parties a comparable amount of the time: Justice Breyer.  This is simply 
an observation but, it appears that those who voted closely with both parties have lower 
activism averages.  The lower the activism average, the closer the voting pattern between 
the two parties.  This figure has a healthy mix of all judicial ideologies, reinforcing my 
null hypothesis. 
Figure VII: 
 
  Source: Compiled by author. 
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 To remove any bias that might be associated with only viewing one type of chart, 
I provided another way to view the material.  I provided Figure VIII that showcases the 
annual activism averages for the liberals and the conservatives.  To get these totals, I 
averaged the annual figures for all of the conservatives and did the same for all of the 
liberals; the line chart shows the resulting data.  This chart spans from 1971 to 2004 
because I needed at least two conservatives and two liberals on the court at all times to 
provide an accurate representation.  I did not have two conservatives on the court until 
1971. 
Looking at this line chart, one can see that the averages are fairly close, until 
1994.  Then the averages for the conservatives rise substantially, (with the exceptions of 
1997, 2001, 2002, and 2004) which lasts throughout the remainder of Rehnquist's tenure 
as chief justice.  This chart exhibits conservative justices engaging in federal statute 
activism more often than liberal justices.     
Figure VIII: 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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State statute activism 
 The averages for state statute activism are significantly higher than the 
corresponding federal averages.  Here the overall average is 4.5%, remember that for 
federal statutes this average was 0.9%.  For example, Justice Black's average went from a 
1.1% level to a 4.6% level.  This means that state statues are overturned more frequently 
than federal statutes, ensuring the primacy of federal statute activism in any discussion on 
the extreme forms of judicial activism.  The highest average belongs to Justice Goldberg 
who has a 10% average. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas have the lowest 
levels, 2.0% and 2.2% respectively.  The majority of justice's averages are between 4.0% 
and 6.5%.  Members of the Rehnquist Court have some of the lowest averages, with 
Stevens having the highest at 4.3%.  It is interesting to see that none of the justices on the 
Rehnquist Court have a score higher than the overall average, especially considering that 
only Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared below the average for federal 
statute activism.  This suggests that liberal justices are more likely to engage in state 
statute activism than are conservative justices.  Figure IX shows the averages for all 
justices on the three courts. 
The same trend holds for lower levels of activism and close vote numbers 
between liberal and conservative majorities, though this pattern is not as accurate as it 
was for federal statute activism.  For example, Justice Whittaker voted with the liberal 
majority 185 times, the conservative majority 165 times, and had an activism average of 
2.7%.  Chief Justice Rehnquist who has the lowest activism average at 2.0% voted with 
the liberal majority 1,039 times but with the conservative majority 1,871 times.  This 
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simply shows that a low activism average is not necessarily a reliable indicator of 
whether or not a justice is moderate. 
Figure IX:  
 
 Figure X displays annual activism averages.  As one can see, some years have 
incredibly high activism levels, such as 1981.  The liberals have higher annual activism 
averages for the most part; however, they are surpassed at a couple of data points, namely 
1995 and 1999.  This figure strengthens my previous statement regarding liberal justices 
being more likely to engage in state statute activism than conservative justices. 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Compiled by author. 
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Figure X: 
 
Altering precedent activism 
 The averages for precedent activism more closely mirror federal statute activism 
than state statute activism.  Although the numbers are closer, the pattern means little as to 
which ideology is more activist since this does not show a clear domination by one 
ideology as did federal statute activism.  Here, the overall average is 1.7%, which is 
almost double that of federal statute activism.  Justices Fortas and Goldberg have the 
highest levels reaching 4.1% and 3.9% respectively.  Due to their short tenure, their 
numbers seem artificially inflated.  Therefore, I cannot stress enough their limited and 
brief time on the bench being the reason for such high figures.  The only justice on the 
Rehnquist Court who passes 2.0% is Justice Kennedy with 2.1%.  Again, members of the 
Rehnquist Court hover near the average with the exception of Kennedy.  2.1% is a pretty 
common figure being shared by Justices Black, Douglas, Stewart, White and Warren with 
a slightly higher average at 2.3%.  The figures dip slightly during the Burger Court, with 
  Source: Compiled by author. 
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averages between 1.6% and 1.8%.  Figure XI shows the overall activism averages for the 
justices of the three courts.  There does not seem to be much connection between 
ideology and altering precedent; there are judicial ideologies scattered throughout the 
chart.  This furthers the credibility of my claim that activism exists within both 
ideologies, no one ideology is in complete control of activism. 
Figure XI: 
 
Figure XII shows the annual averages that pertain to the alteration of precedent.  
Looking at this chart, it is easy to see that both ideologies at one point or another have 
higher averages.  The conservatives surpass the liberals from 1979 to 1983 and then from 
1988 to 1995, with the exceptions of 1989, 1991, and 1992.  The liberals do not surpass 
the conservatives in substantial blocks, but do have higher averages during select years.  
However, it is interesting to note that during the years in which the liberals do have 
higher averages they do not outnumber the conservatives by much.  Examples include the 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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years of 1974, 1976, 1986, 1997, 2001, 2002, and 2004.  With the exception of 1986, all 
of these averages are separated by less than 1 point.  In 1995, the conservatives and 
liberals are separated by almost two full points (5.7% and 3.8% respectively).  Seeing 
that no one party is dominating this field suggests that once again justices from both 
ideologies engage in activism.  
Figure XII:  
 
 Figure XIII has been provided to show each justice's activist average in all three 
criteria.  This bar chart has been sorted by federal statute activism.  This bar chart is an 
excellent display of state statute activism.  By combining all three types of activism, the 
reader really gets a good idea of just how high the state averages really are.  This 
combination of all three types of activism puts the data into perspective.  The main reason 
for the inclusion of this chart is to simplify the material previously shown and to provide 
the reader with a resource that allows them to compare all justices against one another in 
one place.  It is interesting to see how close some justice's totals are grouped, an example 
being Justice Thomas.   It is also interesting to see how spread they can be, an example 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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being Justice Stewart.  As one can see, the justices are mixed throughout.  Though a 
justice may have a higher state activism average than another justice, he or she usually 
has a lower federal activism average or altering precedent activism average.  For 
example, Justice Ginsburg has a higher state activism average than Justice Thomas, but 
he has a higher federal activism average than she does.  This suggests that justices from 
both ideologies engage in activism, though they may pursue it in different avenues. 
Figure XIII: 
 
 Up to this point I have only measured activism based on each justice’s 
conservative or liberal votes.  It is necessary to include another measurement that can be 
declared free of contaminants; thus, I have performed a T-Test that is based upon the 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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party of the appointing president.  Verifying the party of the appointing president is an 
easily proven fact that lends no bias. 
The first important thing to note is that none of the differences are statistically 
significant.  This further confirms the validity of my null hypothesis.  Looking at this 
figure, notice the column marked difference; if a number is positive it means that justices 
appointed by Republicans have a higher activism average than those justices appointed 
by a Democratic president.  If the difference is a negative figure, then justices appointed 
by Democrats have a higher activism average than those appointed by Republican 
presidents.   
Figure XIV: Mean Activist Score by Party of Appointing President
Activism
Democrat 
(N = 14)
Republican 
(N=15) Difference P-Value
Federal-Statute 0.77 0.94 0.17 0.47
State-Statute 4.92 4.13 -0.79 0.29
Altering Precedent 1.76 1.69 -0.07 0.84
Note: All differences are not statistically significant.  
Drawing attention to federal-statute activism, it is easy to see that justices appointed by 
Republicans have a larger activism average.  However, as I have already mentioned, the 
difference is not significant.  Justices appointed by Democratic presidents have higher 
averages in both state-statute and altering precedent activism, although the -.07 difference 
for altering precedent is very slight.  This table shows the same results that the others 
previously listed show: that conservatives have higher activism averages in regard to 
federal statutes, whereas liberals have higher activism averages in regard to state-statutes 
and altering precedent.   
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 One important thing to keep in mind is the fact that once on the bench a justice 
can abandon his or her ideology.  This is one reason why it is difficult to assess the 
ideology of the justice simply by looking at the party of the appointing president.  
Examples of justices whose ideologies changed on the bench include: Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, William Brennan, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens.  President Eisenhower 
is famously noted with stating that his appointment of Warren was “the biggest damn-
fooled mistake (quoted in O’Brien, 70)” he had made as president.  More proof that 
Brennan and Warren were not what President Eisenhower had in mind, is given with the 
following, “(Justice) Clark also recalled how Eisenhower was ‘very much disturbed over 
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan (quoted in O’Brien, 88).”  Souter turned out to 
be more liberal than conservatives thought, “…Souter disappointed supporters of 
Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush… (O’Brien, 88).”  John Paul Stevens, during 
his tenure on the court, has become the most liberal justice currently serving, even though 
a Republican appointed him. 
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Conclusion 
 This thesis sought to answer whether or not a liberal justice was more likely to 
engage in activism than a conservative justice.  The goal was to see whether or not the 
rhetoric spouted by the media was a true assessment of reality.  Chief Justice Warren was 
persecuted for his supposed activism.  The public blamed his Court for, "...all manner of 
social maladies - permissiveness, communism, pornography, venereal disease, and the 
breakdown of the family (Caldeira, 1216)."  Billboards were erected calling for his 
impeachment.  He lost the respect of President Eisenhower, the man who appointed him 
to office.  Since his time in office, the mainstream media is claiming only liberals as 
judicial activists.   The results from the T-test and from the charts show that justices from 
both parties are equally likely to engage in activism, though they may approach it in a 
different manner.    
 After following the history of the term judicial activism and reviewing the various 
definitions available, I established three that would be measured.  The three I chose, due 
to the frequency that they appeared within the literature, were federal statute activism, 
state statute activism and altering precedent activism.  Following this, I provided a brief 
summary on each of the three courts (Warren, Burger and Rehnquist) analyzed.   
I have failed to reject my null hypothesis; there is no difference in activism levels 
between liberal or conservative justices on the Supreme Court.  Averages from the 
justices from all judicial ideologies are scattered throughout the charts, suggesting that 
justices from all ideological backgrounds engage in activism (one ideology is not 
dominating a certain spectrum of each chart).  I established the ideology by looking at the 
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number of cases that they decided with the liberal majority and with the conservative 
majority.  I found that the party of the appointing president was not sufficient in itself, 
considering that several justices switched positions while on the bench.  To curtail 
possible criticism, I ran a t-test that measured a justice’s activism level against the party 
of the appointing president.  Justices appointed by a Republican President did have a 
higher federal statute activism average.  Justices appointed by a Democratic President 
had higher state statute activism and altering precedent averages. However, none of the 
measurements were statistically significant, meaning that no one party is more activist 
than the other.  I mentioned in the literature review that the justices who view the 
Constitution as a living document are more prone to alter precedent than justices who are 
strict constructionists.  Liberal justices typically view the Constitution as a living 
document and the results have suggested the validity of this statement. 
On a side note, Justices Fortas and Goldberg appear high on every level of 
activism; however, I am not putting much attention into these averages because the 
justices on the bench during the same years also had high annual averages.  Although it is 
impossible to say for sure, I do not think their voting shows a significant pattern.  I 
believe their averages were artificially inflated due to their short tenures as well as the 
years they served.  They have been included in all of the charts because I do not want to 
appear biased; however, removing them in later research may verify my thesis further.  
This may have been a chief reason why Lindquist and Cross looked only at natural 
courts. 
 The intent of my thesis is to clear the air regarding which justices are activist.  
Members from both political parties spout accusations that justices representing opposite 
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ideologies are activist.  This thesis clarifies that members representing both ideologies are 
activist. 
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